































Working Paper Series  Brasília  n. 261  Nov.  2011  p. 1-42  





Edited by Research Department (Depep) – E-mail: workingpaper@bcb.gov.br 
 
Editor: Benjamin Miranda Tabak – E-mail: benjamin.tabak@bcb.gov.br 
Editorial Assistant: Jane Sofia Moita – E-mail: jane.sofia@bcb.gov.br 
Head of Research Department: Adriana Soares Sales – E-mail: adriana.sales@bcb.gov.br  
 
The Banco Central do Brasil Working Papers are all evaluated in double blind referee process. 
 
Reproduction is permitted only if source is stated as follows: Working Paper n. 261. 
 




General Control of Publications 
 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Secre/Comun/Cogiv 
SBS – Quadra 3 – Bloco B – Edifício-Sede – 1º andar 
Caixa Postal 8.670 
70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Phones: +55 (61) 3414-3710 and 3414-3565 





The views expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central or  
its members. 
 
Although these Working Papers often represent preliminary work, citation of source is required when used or reproduced. 
 
 
As opiniões expressas neste trabalho são exclusivamente do(s) autor(es) e não refletem, necessariamente, a visão do Banco 
Central do Brasil. 
 




Consumer Complaints and Public Enquiries Center 
 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Secre/Surel/Diate 
SBS – Quadra 3 – Bloco B – Edifício-Sede – 2º subsolo 
70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Fax: +55 (61) 3414-2553 
Internet: <http://www.bcb.gov.br/?english> The relationship between banking market competition
and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?
Benjamin M. Tabak Dimas M. Fazioy Daniel O. Cajueiroz
The Working Papers should not be reported as representing the views
of the Banco Central do Brasil. The views expressed in the papers are
those of the author(s) and not necessarily re
ect those of the Banco
Central do Brasil.
Abstract
This paper aims to study the eect of banking competition on Latin
American banks' risk-taking and whether capitalization and size changes this
relationship. We conclude that: (1) competition aects risk in a non-linear
manner: high/low (average) competition are related to more (less) stability;
(2) bank's size explains the advantage from competition, while capitalization
is only positive for larger banks in this case; (3) capital ratio explains the
advantage from lower competition. These results are of uttermost importance
for bank regulation, specially due to the recent turmoil in worldwide nancial
markets.
Key Words: bank competition, emerging market, nancial stability,
bank regulation
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31 Introduction
The analysis of banking competition has been of great concern in the lit-
erature, specially due to its eects on the nancial stability (Beck et al.,
2006; Schaeck et al., 2009; Wagner, 2010). A competitive banking market
may result in more benets to the society as a whole, such as lower prices
and higher quality of nancial products (Boyd and Nicol o, 2005), but on the
other hand its in
uence on nancial stability is not conclusive according to
the literature. There are two main rival theories on this matter. Some papers
nd that competition, in fact, enhances bank risk-taking behavior, since it
pressures banks to operate with a minimum capital \buer" (Hellman et al.,
2000; Allen and Gale, 2004). Others defend the contrary by stating that
crises are less likely to happen in competitive banking systems (Beck et al.,
2006; Boyd and Nicol o, 2005). Motivated by the process of deregulation and
consolidation that nancial sectors around the world have been facing lately,
specially on the developing world, our paper proposes to analyze whether
competition has any eect on Latin American nancial stability and if this
relationship changes with other factors, such as size and capitalization. Our
interest is to determine whether one of these theories better explain the case
of Latin American banks or even if they are both simultaneously valid.
The studies that support the concentration-stability (or competition-
fragility) view state that banks may have a higher prot premium in collusive
markets, creating a buer from crises and therefore, reducing their incentives
to take risks (Hellman et al., 2000). In fact, in a competitive market, man-
agers may be forced to take more risks on behalf of the shareholders, since
competition reduces the prots of managers and shareholders, as well (Kee-
ley, 1990). Allen and Gale (2004) also arm that this increased risk may
be due to a higher bank exposure to contagion in competitive markets. An
adverse shock can cause a bank to go bankrupt and, thus, it may trigger
a chain reaction where all banks that were exposed to the rst bank also
go bankrupt and so forth. Since under perfect competition these banks are
price-takers, and therefore small compared to the whole market, no bank
will have an incentive to provide liquidity to the troubled bank, causing the
contagion to spread. In addition, there is the matter of adverse selection
is worsened in a competitive market, i.e. in the presence of many banks in
the market (Broecker, 1990; Nakamura, 1993; Shaer, 1998). The chance
of a poor quality borrower to apply for a loan at any bank is an increasing
function of the number of banks, decreasing the quality of loan portfolio of
the entire banking market.
A rival view, the \concentration-fragility" (or competition-stability), states
that a more collusive banking market increases the nancial fragility. Boyd
4and Nicol o (2005) show that the higher interest rates charged by banks in a
less competitive market may enhance the risk-taking behavior of borrowers
and, therefore, increase the probability of a systemic risk1. The trade-o be-
tween competition and risk ceases to exist in this analysis by assuming that
banks are solving an optimal contracting problem. In other words, banks are
supposed to be agents in relation to their depositors, but they are also prin-
cipal in relation to the borrowers. According to the authors, the literature
ignores the bank-borrower relationship and for that reason it does not see
competition as the social optimum.
Since competition cannot directly be measured, the literature has used
several dierent methods to estimate competitive levels of a specic sector.
This paper, in particular, employs an innovative method to measure com-
petition, known as the Boone indicator, which was introduced by the work
of Boone (2008). This indicator measures the impact of eciency on per-
formance. The stronger this impact is, the higher the degree of competition
a bank is facing. A few works in fact have already used this measure for
the banking sector. For example, Schaeck and Cih ak (2010) and Leuven-
steijin et al. (2007) employs the Boone indicator for banks from the US and
Europe. After that, in order to assess for whether the competition-stability
or competition-fragility relationship holds for 10 Latin American countries
between 2001 and 2008, we regress the Boone indicator on the banks' risk
taking for these countries. This risk-taking measure is the \stability ine-
ciency" from Fang et al. (2011), whose estimation approach is a Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA).
Additionally, we are also interested to test how size and capitalization
changes the relationship between competition and stability. In fact, as noted
above, the proponents of the concentration-stability view, state that larger
banks tend to operate better in collusive markets, even they have not pro-
vided an empirical proof of this. Shaer and DiSalvo (1994) demonstrate
that the presence of large banks in relation to the market is not a sucient
condition to re
ect collusion 2. Thus, we would like to test if this assump-
1See Wagner (2010) for a extension of this analysis, where the author contradicts the
conclusions of Boyd and Nicol o (2005). If one assumes that banks can choose between dif-
ferent types of borrowers, competition can pressure these banks to nance riskier projects
so as to maintain their optimal risk-taking level.
2This matter has been thoroughly discussed in the literature. Claessens and Laeven
(2004), for example, that nd a positive relation between concentration and competition;
Shaer and DiSalvo (1994) that nd a high degree of banking competition in a small Penn-
sylvania county, even though the market structure was a duopoly; Maudos and Guevara
(2007) that suggest that the eect of market concentration and competition on banks' ef-
ciency is dierent. On the other hand, Bikker and Haaf (2002), Deltuvaite et al. (2007),
Chan et al. (2007), Turk-Ariss (2009) regress competition indicators on market concen-
5tion indeed holds by interacting the competition measure with a proxy of
size. We also include an interaction between competition and equity ratio
(capitalization) to test if a bank may be pressured to take more risks when
they have an higher participation of sharholders' capital in relation to their
assets given the competitive degree. There are two opposed eects in this
case. Capital ratio can discipline banks due to the capital at risk eect,
or decrease stability through a franchise value eect (Keeley, 1990; Hellman
et al., 2000). The overall eect is, then, ambiguous.
The recent world nancial crisis has made bank regulators utterly inter-
ested in determining how risk-taking depends on variables of market struc-
ture, bank size and leverage (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2010). Through the implementation of the Basel III accord, they would
like to impose restrictions for banks to utilize a larger fraction of their own
capital in their operations. The objective is to reduce both the exposure to
contagion and the risk-taking behavior. In fact, the main concern of these
regulators regards the too big to fail (TBTF) banks. Because of their sys-
temic importance, these banks are likely to incur in risks, believing that the
authorities will assist them if any problem should occur (basically, a moral
hazard problem). Not only this creates instability in the banking market,
but also TBTF banks are too costly to save (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga,
2010b). The literature, therefore, must have a vanguard role in investigating
this eld so as to bring forth eective solutions for policy makers, specially on
the eve of the implementation of this accord. As already stated before, this
is our main motivation and, in the end, we intend to contribute relevantly to
this topic.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we describe our method-
ology, dening the variables of interest and the regression approaches taken;
in Section 3, we present and summarize the data sources; we demonstrate
and discuss the empirical results in Section 4, and nally in Section 5 we
make our the nal remarks regarding the outcome of this paper.
2 Methodology
2.1 The estimation of a competition measure: the Boone
indicator
The fact that the competition level is not observable has resulted in many
dierent methods of measuring and estimating it. First, we may highlight the
tration and found a negative relationship, supporting the structure-conduct-performance
(SCP) paradigm.
6SCP paradigm, which have used concentration measures as proxy of compe-
tition (e.g. Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994; Berger and Hannan, 1998). The idea
of this theory is that structure re
ects conduct and, thus, market concentra-
tion means collusion. Latter on, the New Economic Industrial Organization
(NEIO) paradigm emerged with the idea of estimating parameters that re-

ects the competition level of a market. The two most used are the models
of Bresnahan (1982), and Panzar and Rosse (1987). The rst calculates com-
petition by estimating simultaneously the supply and demand function of a
given market, thus employing industry-aggregate data. Table 1 provides a
brief review of the literature about the Bresnahan approach. The second is
widely utilized in studies about this matter, since it only requires easily avail-
able data. This model use a reduced form revenue equation to construct the
H-statistic, which is calculated as the sum of the elasticities of total revenues
in respect to factor input prices, i.e. it measures market power by the extent
to which a change in factor input prices in
uences the equilibrium revenues
of a bank. Table 2 also presents a literature review on the papers that have
utilized this method.
Place Tables 1 and 2 About Here
In addition to these already popular measures, Boone (2008) has recently
developed a new method of estimating competition. The Boone indicator
(), as it is called, considers that competition improves the performance of
ecient rms and weaken the performance of inecient ones. The idea of this
indicator is clearly based on the eciency structure hypothesis by Demsetz
(1973). Thus, it measures the impact of eciency on performance, in terms
of prots and market shares. The stronger this eect is, the larger in absolute
values  will be. The simplest equation to identify the Boone Indicator for
bank i is dened as follows:
ln(MSki) =  +  ln(MCki); (1)
where MSki stands for the market share of bank i in the output k, MC is
the marginal cost, and  denotes the Boone Indicator. In this paper, we
are going to focus on the analysis of competition in the loans market, so
k = loans.
As an assumption of Boone (2008), competition means that the banks'
products are close substitutes and/or entry costs are low. This itself is an ad-
vantage of the his indicator over the concentration measures and some other
competition proxies. Suppose, for example, that bank product substitution
7increases. Then, ecient banks gain market share and, as the eciency
structure hypothesis proposes, there is more competition in the market. If
these \ecient banks" are those which already have a dominant position in
relation to the others, the HHI would increase, instead of decreasing. Also,
measures that imply that competition is inversely proportional to the mag-
nitude of the price margin over marginal costs would not capture this eect
as well. Ecient banks may charge higher prices because of their ecient
lead, which can make them reduce marginal costs quicker than prices.
Among other advantages of the Boone indicator, we highlight the possi-
bility of measuring competition for several specic product markets and also
dierent categories of banks. This positive characteristic may have many in-
teresting implications for future research on the competition issue. Not only
it is possible to know which bank output is subject to more or less compet-
itive pressures, but also we can compare dierent types of banks in terms
of competition. As an example, Leuvensteijin et al. (2007) use the Boone
indicator and, among other results, they nd that commercial banks appear
to face more competition than cooperative and saving banks, specially in
Germany and the US.
On the other hand, there is also some disadvantages. For instance, be-
cause of a eciency improvement (i.e. a decrease in marginal costs), banks
may choose to decrease the price it charges in order to gain market share
or even to increase its prots and maintain the same share as before. We,
therefore, have to suppose that banks pass at least part of its eciency gains
to consumers. In addition, since we have to estimate this indicator, it is
constrained to the problem of idiosyncratic variation, i.e. uncertainty, as any
other estimated parameter.
Because one cannot observe marginal costs directly, Schaeck and Cih ak
(2010) approximate a rm's marginal costs by the ratio of average variable
costs to total income, while Leuvensteijin et al. (2007) calculate the marginal
costs from a translog cost function for each country considered in their data.
Our approach is similar to this last one, which is an improvement with respect
to the former. Besides being more closely in line with the theory, the use of
a translog function oers the possibility of calculating the marginal costs of
any one of the outputs in the specication, such the loan market, whereas
their costs are also not directly available (Leuvensteijin et al., 2007). We
assume a translog cost function for bank i, and year t and estimate it for
each country in the sample separately. We then derive the marginal costs
from its estimation and then we use this variable as the independent regressor
















































+ Dummiest + "it; (2)
where C stands for the bank's total cost; y represents four outputs: total
loans, total deposits, other earning assets, and non-interest income, this last
being a measure of bank non-traditional activity3; w consists in two input
prices: interest expenses to total deposits (price of funds), non-interest ex-
penses to total assets (price of capital)4. The objective of normalizing the
dependent variable and one input price (w1) by another input price (w2) is
to ensure linear homogeneity.
Thus, we can obtain the marginal costs of loans (l) if we take the rst
derivative of the dependent variable in equation 2 in relation to the output




















Having calculated the marginal costs for loans, we can proceed to esti-
mating the Boone indicator as in equation (1), but with small changes. In
this study, we will calculate the Boone Indicator in two dierent specica-
tions. First, we evaluate the competitive conditions for each Latin American
banking market in the whole period; second, we assess for the changes in
competition through the years in these same countries. The estimation of
the following equation for each country separately gives us the competitive
conditions in the loans market for the full sample period:
ln(MSilt) =  +  ln(MCilt) + Dummiest + eilt: (4)
3There is a growing acceptance in the incorporation of variables of bank non-traditional
activities (such as o-balance sheet and non-interest income) in the banking analysis
(Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). Ignoring these measures can be misleading, since
it does not take into account the bank's balance sheet as a whole. Due to a high num-
ber of missing values on Latin American banks' o-balance sheet, we only employ the
non-interest income as a non-traditional output.
4Total assets is employed instead of xed assets due to several missing data of the
latter.
9The equation above represents the relationship between individual market
costs (MCilt) and market shares (MSilt) in the loans market of bank i at time
t. We also add time dummies to control for timely evolution of the market
share within a country. We expect that banks with low marginal costs gain
market share, i.e.  < 0. Competition tends to increase this eect, since
more ecient banks outperform less ecient ones. The more negative is ,
the higher is the competition level in a banking market. However, positive
values for  are also possible as we can see in Leuvensteijin et al. (2007).
This means that the more marginal costs a bank has, the more market share
it will earn. We can think of two reasons to explain this phenomena: (i) the
market has an extreme level of collusion or (ii) the banks are competing on
quality. This last reason may re
ect strong collusion, as well. Banks may
increase their costs in order to capture additional demand by the quality
channel as the market as a whole grows, which is a clear obstruction of the
entry of competitors in this same market (Dick, 2007).
However, it is not enough to observe how strong competition for the
period as a whole. We are also interested to observe the time evolution of
the degree of competition. In order to assess this time development, we
consider the following equation, where we interact the Boone Indicator with
time dummies, making it time dependent:
ln(MSilt) =  +
X
t=2001;:::;2008
t Dummiest ln(MCilT) + DummiesT + eilt:
(5)
The estimation of the Boone indicator for each year t is a result of this
specication. We can, therefore, analyze how competition has changed over
time by considering the intensity banks with low marginal costs in loans gains
market share in this market by year.
As in Leuvensteijin et al. (2007) and Schaeck and Cih ak (2010), we are
also aware of a possible endogeneity problem in the estimation of equations
(4) and (5). Both papers point out that the determination of performance
and cost are determined simultaneously. Our approach is rst to test whether
endogeneity is indeed present in our specications. This tests consists in the
dierence of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation where we
treat MC as endogenous, and one for the equation where we treat MC
as as exogenous. Under conditional homoskedasticity, this endogeneity test
statistic is numerically equal to a Hausman test statistic (see Hayashi, 2000,
for more information). Consequently, if we conrm this problem, we utilize
a two-step GMM estimator where we use one lag of MCilt as instrument.
Otherwise we use a xed-eects OLS method, more specically the within
10estimator, to regress the models. In both cases we perform the kernel-based
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimation
by Newey and West (1987), in order to control for both of these problems.
2.2 Evaluating the impact of competition on risk-taking
In this subsection, we present the empirical analysis of the relationship be-
tween competition and risk-taking. For this purpose, we employ a measure
that re
ects banks' risk-taking behavior, the Z-score. Many other studies
evaluating bank risk-taking behavior also use this measure, which conrms
its acceptance in the literature (Mercieca et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine,
2009; Houston et al., 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010a). The Z-
score measures the number of ROA standard deviations that a bank's ROA
plus its leverage have to decrease in order for the bank to become insolvent
(or Z  score = (ROA+Capital Ratio)=ROA). In other words, the Z-score
is inversely proportional to the bank's probability of default.
This measure has been often employed in cross-section OLS models, where
one can calculate the mean and standard deviation of ROA for the whole
period. We, however, propose to calculate this measure for each three years
(present year and the two precedents) so as to maintain the Z-score as an
panel variable. Instead of eliminating the time dimension of the analysis,
this approach only reduces the time period we consider by two-years.
In addition, we follow the model that Fang et al. (2011) introduce, to
estimate the impact of competition, size and capital on bank's risk tak-
ing. This method consists in estimating a stochastic frontier (Aigner et al.,
1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) with the Z-score as the dependent
variable of the translog specication, so as to provide a measure of bank's
\stability ineciency". The main idea of these authors is that the Z-score
does not necessarily re
ect the potential stability each bank can achieve.
One has also to consider the deviation from banks' current stability and the
maximum stability given the economic and regulatory conditions, which they
denominate as the \stability eciency" analysis. At the same time, we em-
ploy the ineciency explanatory variables in the specication through the
method of Battese and Coelli (1995). Thus, we use the maximum likelihood
to estimate the Z-score translog specication and the ineciency correlates
simultaneously.
The equation we consider for estimating this frontier is very similar of
equation (2), but instead of C (costs) we employ the Z-score and the error
term "it equals it   it. The rst term (it) captures the random distur-
bances, assumed to be normally distributed, and representing measurement
11errors and other uncontrollable factors, i.e., it
iid  N(0;2
). The second (it)
captures technical and allocative ineciency, both under managerial control,
and it is assumed to be half-normally distributed, i.e., it  N+(it;2
). The
degree of \stability eciency", in this case, represents how close a bank is
to the maximum Z-score, i.e. the stochastic frontier. The model to estimate
















































+ 1T + 2T
2 + Macroeconomic Variables + it   it; (6)
where the output and input variables are the same from equation (2). We
employ country environment variables in order to control for cross-country
heterogeneity of banking markets. The use of macroeconomic variables in the
translog functions has been considered very important by the literature in
the correct estimation of cross-country eciency scores (Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas, 2000; Fries and Taci, 2005). These variables re
ect specic character-
istics, such as geography, economic condition and nancial dynamism, and
we detail them next. First, we employ the density of population, measured by
the ratio of inhabitants per square kilometers, because we believe that banks
operating in a region with a high density of population might have lower
expenses. We use the density of demand, i.e. the ratio of total deposits to
square kilometers, so as control for the possible higher bank expenses when
the density of demand is low. We employ the GDP per capita to assess for
the general development of the economy. The purpose of also employing the
ratio of equity to assets is to control for the regulatory conditions. In addi-
tion, we use the ratio of loans to deposits that consists on the rate in which
deposits are converted into loans, i.e. the size of intermediation. Finally, we
also use the real GDP growth, as a proxy of economic dynamics.
There is, however, a problem in applying the natural logarithm of the Z-
score in equation (6), since this variable can take negative values as well. In
order to solve this problem we follow Bos and Koetter (2009) who employs an
additional independent variable - the Negative Performance Indicator (NPI)
- that takes the value of 1 when Z-score  0 and it is equal to the absolute
value of Z-score, when Z-score < 0. We also change the dependent variable
to take the value of 1, when it is negative.
As we have already stated, parallel to the estimation of this stability
frontier we also introduce the ineciency correlates in the model. In other
12words, we dene the mean value of the ineciency term it for the Z-score
function as follows:




where z is a vector of n bank-specic variables that explains eciency of
bank i at time t. In our case, this vector of variables comprises the following
variables: (1) the opposite of Boone indicator (i.e.  t) that we estimate
from equation (5) and its square value, as well; (2) the equity to assets ratio
(Capital Ratio), as a measure of capitalization; (3) liquid assets to total
assets ratio (Liquidity), as a measure of liquidity; (4) the natural logarithm
of assets (SIZE); (5) and the loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR, in
%) to control for bank's loan portfolio risk. Finally, we also add ownership
dummies to assess for dierences of stability ineciency across dierent bank
ownership type.
The idea of employing the opposite of the Boone indicator is to make
it directly proportional to competition. Moreover, we also add a quadratic
term of this measure to capture a possible non-linearity of the competition-
risk relationship. Although this non-linear analysis can have a crucial im-
plication to the nancial stability debate, it has been largely overlooked
by the literature. Finally, with the purpose of making the results clearer,
and also robust, we also add specications in which we employ competition
dummies instead of the Boone indicator. These dummies are for High (
Boone+0:5Boone), Average (< Boone+0:5Boone and > Boone 0:5Boone)
and Low ( Boone   0:5Boone) competition. The division of competition
into three dierent categories has the purpose of identifying possible non-
linearities in the model, as well.
As an additional test, we are also interest to analyze whether the competition-
risk relationship changes among dierent bank size and capitalization. We
test if larger banks outperform others in collusive markets due to higher prof-
its, and/or if the magnitude of shareholders' capital can in fact force banks
to take on more risks. In this regard, Carletti (2010) arms that funding
and regulation have the same importance as market structure for explaining
how the recent crisis has aected dierent banking sectors. To achieve this
result, we add the following specications to equation (6) by interacting the
Boone indicator and its square term with: (i) SIZE; (ii) Capital Ratio; (iii)
both Capital Ratio and SIZE. We also estimate these specications again
interacting all three dummies of competition with SIZE and Capital Ratio.
133 Data
Initially, our data consisted in the population of four bank specializations -
commercial, cooperative, real-state and specialized government institutions
- that had been operating in 10 Latin American countries from 2001 to
2008. We have taken the relevant data from from the BankScope, a nan-
cial database distributed by BVD-IBCA and converted to US dollars, which
guarantees accounting uniformity between dierent countries. We also check
carefully these data in the respective countries' central banks. After exclud-
ing banks/periods with missing, negative or zero values for inputs and out-
puts and other relevant data, our resulting sample for estimating the Boone
indicator is an unbalanced panel data of 376 banks, totalizing 2243 observa-
tions. Additionally, since we have used two time lags in order to calculate the
Z-score our database to estimate the risk-taking correlates reduced to 1491
observations from 2003 to 2008. Table 3 shows the names and descriptions
of the variables we use in the models of last section.
Place Table 3 About Here
First of all, Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the bank-level vari-
ables used in the translog specications by country. From this Table, one
may identify that the banks from some of the main economies in the region,
such as Mexico, Chile and Brazil, have on average the largest loan and de-
posit portfolios. On the other hand, the smallest banking systems in terms
of loans and deposits, for example are those from Costa Rica and Dominican
Republic. Nevertheless, the size of the banking market does not seem to re-

ect overall stability. In terms of the Z-score, the banking markets of Costa
Rica, Panama and Chile are the most stable, while those of Argentina and
Brazil are the least stable.
Place Table 4 About Here
Second, the summary of the variables we use in the risk-taking model
is available in Table 5. This Table also includes the percentiles to better
understand how distributed are these variables. As one can observe from the
Z-score and LLR variables, our data encompasses banks that are practically
bankrupt (low Z-score and high LLR), and extremely stable banks (high Z-
score and low LLR). Furthermore, the bank's size variable (SIZE) ranges
14from 8.941 (bank assets equal to U$ 7.639 millions) to 19.36 (bank assets
equal to U$ 255.823 billions) that re
ects a widely dispersed distribution of
this variable.
Place Table 5 About Here
Additionally, in Table 6, we show the cross-correlation between our main
independent variables of the model. An interesting thing to note is that size
appear to be negatively correlated with the capital ratio, which means that
large banks have a higher propensity to use capital from other entities, i.e.
to acquire liabilities. This fact will be important in the following sections,
since our goal is to determine whether size and capital ratio changes the
relation between competition and risk. Greater capital ratio also seems to
re
ect higher stability, because of the positive correlations with Z-score and
ROA. We will conrm this last result latter.
Place Table 6 About Here
Finally, Table 7 presents the means and standard deviations of the country-
environment variables that we employ in the Z-score translog specication.
They consist in economic and nancial sector development indicators in order
to access for cross-country dierences in economic and nancial conditions.
These macroeconomic data were taken from the IMF's World Economic Out-
look, World Bank's database, and BankScope5. In fact, in Latin America,
there are some essential economic dierences between countries. While there
are some with a dynamic economy and satisfactory social conditions, other
countries are more vulnerable and present poor social indicators. These
variables may have direct in
uence on the protability and stability of the
corresponding banking systems.
Place Table 7 About Here
5Bank's deposits, loans, assets and equity by country have been aggregated using the
original database from the central banks to proxy for total nancial sector's deposits,
loans, assets and equity.
154 Empirical Results
4.1 Boone coecient scores
In this section, we present the results from the Boone indicator estimation.
In order to obtain the marginal costs, we estimate a translog cost functions
for each country considered. Then, we regress these marginal costs on the
market share in the loans market. The coecient of this last variable () is
considered to be the Boone indicator. The more negative, this indicator is,
the more competitive is a specic banking market.
Place Table 8 About Here
The results of the Boone indicator by country for the whole period con-
sidered are presented in Table 8. The endogeneity test has pointed out that
only for Peru has marginal costs been considered endogenous (at 5% signif-
icance level) in the estimation of equation (4). Thus, we employ a GMM
estimator for this country and we use an OLS for all the others. The overall
result suggests that Latin American banks are operating in a less competi-
tive market than in Europe and in the US, if we compare with the results
from Leuvensteijin et al. (2007). However, we also acknowledge that this sort
of comparison should be made carefully, since the estimation of the Boone
indicator, depends on how it was modeled. For example, Schaeck and Cih ak
(2010) have employed in the Boone estimation ROA instead of market share
as the dependent variable and average costs instead of marginal costs as the
independent variable. They found that the Boone indicator for the US and
Europe was concentrated between 0 and -0.15. The model of Leuvensteijin
et al. (2007), on the other hand, is closer to ours despite some dierences
being apparent.
Another conclusion is that competition seems to be very heterogeneous
across Latin American countries, with Peru and Colombia being, respectively,
the most competitive banking markets, and Chile and Costa Rica being the
most collusive ones. In fact, the Boone indicator for Chile is not signicantly
dierent from 0 (monopoly) at 10% signicance level. Other large economies
of Latin America, like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, show a
moderate level of banking competition in this period. These results shed some
light in the development level of institutional framework of Latin American
countries.
Place Table 9 About Here
16We can also estimate the Boone indicator by year in order to consider the
time evolution of competition. Table 9 shows these Boone indicators for Latin
American countries. Through this analysis, we can observe that competition
has evolved dierently across Latin American countries. While in some coun-
tries, competition has increased throughout the years (Argentina, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Mexico), in others competition has decreased (Brazil,
Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela). Competition has not changed signicantly
through time in Peru and Chile.
For some countries there are even years where the Boone indicator is
not statistically dierent from 0 (zero) or signicantly positive. As we have
already stated before, positive values for this measure may mean perfect
collusion or competition in quality. The latter, however, may result in an
increase barriers to entry, i.e. more collusion as well. Consequently, perfect
collusion may be the case of Argentina in the years of 2001-2002 (peak of the
economic crisis this country has faced); Chile for all the years except 2007;
Costa Rica in 2008; Dominican Republic from 2001 to 2003; Mexico in 2001;
Panama in 2007 and 2008; and Venezuela in 2001 and in 2005 to 2008.
4.2 Competition-Stability analysis
In this section, we present the results of our main model, whose objective
is to estimate the relationship between competition and banks' risk-taking
behavior, and how this competition changes due to the in
uence of capital-
ization and size on risk-taking, as well. For example, Hellman et al. (2000)
and Allen and Gale (2000) suggests that larger banks have a higher prot
margin in collusive markets, and this is why these banks are more stable in
these conditions. Competition can also pressure banks to take more risks
depending on size and capitalization of these banks.
Tables 10 to 13 show the estimations of equation (7), where we regress a
series of explanatory variables variables on the \stability ineciency". Neg-
ative coecients mean that the corresponding variables are inversely pro-
portional to nancial fragility, and thus they appear to increase stability.
Positive coecients, on the other hand, means that the variables are directly
proportional to fragility. In the rst column of every Table we employ the
Boone indicator as the proxy of competition. Since this indicator is inversely
proportional to competition (the more negative is this measure, the more
competitive is a banking market), in reality we add the opposite of this indi-
cator (Boone =  t) so as to make it directly proportional to competition.
In addition, the second to fourth columns of each Table employs dummies
that represent high, average and low competition, respectively. Each table
has one dierent specication as well in which we add interactions between
17the competition proxies, size, and capitalization variables.
Place Table 10 About Here
We note from column [1] of Table 10 that the relationship between com-
petition and risk taking appears to be
T
-shaped. In other words, banks
operating under low and high competition levels are the less fragile ones,
while banks under average competition are those with a more aggressive
risk-taking behavior. The negative and signicant coecients of high and
low competition dummies and the positive coecient of average competition
in columns [2] to [4] conrm this result. Our ndings accept (and at the
same time reject) the \concentration-fragility" and \concentration-stability"
theories at the same time for Latin American banks. These results are similar
to those of Berger et al. (2009) for 30 developed economies' banking sectors.
These authors state that nding evidence to support one of the theories does
not necessarily excludes the other. However, we cannot yet arm what are
the reasons of why banks are better of in both competitive and collusive
banking markets. We expect that the other specications will clarify these
reasons.
In what regards the other control variables, we may observe that loan
loss reserves have a detrimental eect on stability. We have already expected
this result, since the motive of adding this variable was to control for banks'
exposure degree. The capital ratio has a negative and signicant coecient,
which conrms the idea that banks are more cautions when the shareholders
have more capital at stake, i.e. the moral hazard hypothesis (see Berger and
DeYoung, 1997). The coecient of liquidity is positive and signicant, and
thus banks with more liquidity seem be farther from the stability frontier.
We also conclude that private and foreign banks appear to be more inecient
in terms of stability in relation to public banks, as well.
Place Table 11 About Here
Table 11 shows the results on the specication in which we interact SIZE
and competition variables, in which we want to know whether the impact of
size varies with competition levels. In column [1], the interactions of SIZE and
Boone and its square value show that the eect of SIZE on nancial fragility
is
T
shaped as a function of the Boone indicator. We must take the rst
derivative of the rst column in respect of SIZE to understand better how this
18eect varies with the Boone indicator. This eect is as follows: @=@SIZE =
 9:10Boone2+7:75Boone 1:65, whose roots are 0.417 and 0.435. In fact,
when we interact SIZE and the dummy of high competition in column [2], we
nd from the sign of its coecient that large banks appear to perform better
in less collusive markets. If the variable SIZE is larger than 10.13, i.e. with at
least U$25.2 million assets, the coecient of the competition dummy becomes
negative 6. In column [3], the interaction between the average competition
dummy and SIZE is insignicant. Finally, column [4] shows that under a low
competition, banks are more stable for all values for SIZE, but decreasing
in this last variable. At the same time, when Low = 1 the eect of SIZE
becomes slightly positive, but not signicant in accordance with a Wald Test
(p-value = 0.27). The other control variables have similar coecients than
those of the last Table.
The result above implies that we do not have reasons to accept the state-
ment of the concentration-stability literature that larger banks in collusive
markets are more stable, even though we cannot reject this theory per se (or
at least half of it as discussed before), i.e. the fact that banks under low
competition are more stable. In fact, our ndings suggest that larger banks
are less risk-takers in a competitive environment. However, we cannot say
that under lower competitive levels, the eect of size is detrimental to overall
stability due to the insignicant eects of columns [3] and [4]. There must be
other reasons, therefore, for why low competition is also positive for banks'
stability, such as the amount of shareholder's capital, which we will analyze
in Table 12.
Place Table 12 About Here
The
T
-shaped eect on risk-taking as a function of competition also ap-
pears to be the case of the Capital Ratio, as we can see by the rst column
of Table 12. Column [4] supports these results, due to the negative coef-
cient of the interaction between the low competition dummy and capital
ratio. The interaction coecients in columns [2] and [3] are both insigni-
cant, suggesting that high and average competition levels do not change the
negative eect of capital ratio on stability ineciency. Additionally, these
ndings also point out under low competition this negative impact of capital
ratio is more pronounced. Therefore, collusive banking markets is positive
for overall bank stability, specially for those banks with a high capital ratio.
6A wald test shows that the eect of SIZE on ineciency under high competition
becomes signicantly negative at approximately SIZE= 11:7.
19This last statement gives support to Berger et al. (2009) when they arm
that even if collusion leads to riskier loan portfolios (as in Boyd and Nicol o,
2005), banks may increase their equity capital in order to protect maintain
their overall stability. An eective regulamentary policy to reduce nancial
fragility would be the imposition of higher capital requirement that implies
lower liabilities7.
Consequently, the results above show that capitalization explains why col-
lusion reduces risk-taking in the Latin American banking market. According
to the denitions of Hellman et al. (2000), the capital-at-risk eect is greater
than the franchise-value eect in the case of low competition in the Latin
American region. That is, there is no indication that capital ratio aects
franchise values so as to force a bank to take risks. For example, Repullo
(2004) arms that this eect is insignicant if one assumes that the costs
of higher capital requirements are fully transferred to the depositors of that
bank.
Although we have tested how size and capital interacts with competition
separately, there is also the need to understand how is their jointly in
uence
on risk-taking. In other words, the question we pose is whether large banks
benets the most from high (or low) capital ratios given the competitive
level. Table 13 shows these results.
Place Table 13 About Here
Column [2] of this Table shows that, supposing the high competition
dummy equals to one, the interaction between SIZE and Capital Ratio be-
comes more negative, and the coecient of capital ratio alone becomes more
positive as well. The coecients of \High Comp." and SIZE, alone, are
insignicant, as well as its interaction. Therefore, the interpretation of the
results in the nal column of this Table is as follows: for banks with assets
larger than U$ 222.2 million (SIZE = 12.31) and operating under high com-
petition (i.e. High Comp. = 1) , the capital ratio appears to reduce stability
ineciency. Regarding column [3], when average competition is equal to one,
we can conclude that the coecient of the interaction of SIZE and capital
ratio becomes closer to zero. Thus, there appears to be a positive eect of
7According to Carletti (2010), even within bank's liabilities, the funding structure can
have an important role in explaining stability. In the recent nancial crisis, banks are
more stable when they rely more on depository than on wholesale funding. In other
words, banks that were more exposed to short-term borrowing, were deeply aected by
the nancial crisis (Carletti, 2010)
20Capital Ratio on the \stability ineciency" for all banking sizes, but de-
creasing in this last variable. Finally, all the interactions with the dummy of
low competition are insignicant in column [4].
5 Conclusion
This paper has the purpose of determining whether competition improves or
reduces banking stability for 10 Latin American countries between the years
2001 and 2008. Although there have been several articles concerning this
issue, the literature has not yet reached a clear consensus of whether compe-
tition stimulates banks to take risks. Since competition cannot be calculated
directly, we estimate, as a competition measure, the Boone indicator of the
loans market, whose value shows how intense is the eect of more ecient
banks earning market share. Then, we regress this indicator on risk-taking so
as to identify how nancial stability reacts with dierent competition levels.
Finally, we evaluate how this relationship changes with both bank's size and
capital ratio.
Our results support both theories of concentration-stability and concentration-
fragility due to a nonlinearity of the eect of competition on risk-taking.
Banks under high and low competition are both, on average, more stable
than banks under average competition. However, the reasons for these re-
sults are dierent. Banks in competitive markets are more stable, specially
if they are larger in size. Under competition, capitalization only seems be a
positive in
uence for nancial stability for banks of higher size as well. On
the other hand, in collusive markets it is capitalization that matters, since
banks with a larger capital ratio are more stable. The reasons of why aver-
age competition appear to increase nancial fragility are not claried in our
model.
Besides addressing to a gap in the literature, this paper contributes to
the current discussion on nancial regulation in the light of the Basel III
implementation. As one of the proposition of this regulatory standard, a
harsher capital requirement might benet larger Latin American banks op-
erating under high competition and banks in general under low competition.
Therefore, there are clear indications that Basel III, if implemented, would
be advantageous for the region in terms of nancial stability.
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27Table 1: Literature on banking competition - Bresnahan (1982) approach.
Author(s) Period Countries Results
Shaer (1989) 1941-1983 USA Perfect competition
Shaer (1993) 1965-1989 Canada Perfect competition despite high concentration
Shaer (2002) 1979-1991 Switzerland Foreign-owned banks have more market power
than the state-owned
Coccorese (2008) 1995-2004 Italy Imperfect competition.
Coccorese (2005) 1988-2000 Italy The eight largest banks are under imperfect competition.
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) 1974-2000 Japan On average, competition is increasing.
Canhoto (2004) 1990-1995 Portugal Imperfect competition in the deposit market
Toolsema (2002) 1993-1999 The Netherlands Consumer credit market was under perfect competition.
28Table 2: Literature on banking competition - Panzar and Rosse (1987) ap-
proach
Author(s) Period Countries Results
Nathan and Neave (1989) 1982-1984 Canada Perfect competition for 1982 and monopolistic
competition for 1983 and 1984.
Shaer and DiSalvo (1994) 1970-86 Pennsylvania(USA) Duopoly; high competition.
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) 1993-95 Greece Monopolistic Competition.
Rozas (2007) 1986-2005 Spain Monopolistic competition; larger
banks are more competitive.
Mamatzakis et al. (2005) 1998-2002 SEE countries Monopolistic competition.
Coccorese (2004) 1997-1999 Italy Monopolistic competition.
Trivieri (2007) 1996-2000 Italy Monopolistic competition; Banks involved
in cross-ownership are less competitive.
Deltuvaite et al. (2007) 2000-2006 Lithuania Monopolistic competition.
Maudos and Sol s (2007) 1993-2005 Mexico Monopolistic Competition
Bikker and Haaf (2002) 1988-1998 23 countries Monopolistic Competition for almost
all countries; perfect competition
cannot be rejected in some cases.
Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) 1989-1996 EU-15 countries Monopolistic competition; concentration
impairs competition
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) 1986-2004 101 countries Declining competition for developed countries;
increasing for emerging economies.
Bikker et al. (2006) 1986-2005 120 countries Monopolistic competition is predominant.
Bandt and Davis (2000) 1992-1996 Germany, USA, France Competition is lower in small banks
and Italy and higher in US banks.
Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986-1989 France, UK, Spain, Monopoly for Italy and monopolistic
Germany, and Italy competition for the rest.
Chan et al. (2007) 1996-2005 Australia and New Zealand Conjectural variation oligopoly
or monopoly for both markets.
Smith and Tripe (2001) 1996-1999 New Zealand Monopolistic competition; in 1997, monopoly.
Yuan (2006) 1996-2000 China Perfect competition.
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 1993-2000 11 Latin American countries Monopolistic Competition.
Yeyati and Micco (2007) 1993-2002 8 Latin American countries Monopolistic Competition.
Duncan (2003) 1989-2002 Jamaica Monopolistic competition.
Belaisch (2003) 1997-2000 Brazil Monopolistic competition.
Park (2009) 1992-2004 Korea Monopolistic competition and perfect
competition during the crisis
Molyneux et al. (1996) 1986;1988 Japan Monopoly for 1986; monopolistic
competition for 1988.
Turk-Ariss (2009) 2000-2006 12 MENA countries Monopoly for North African countries and
monopolistic competition for the others.
Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) 1993-2002 8 GCC countries Perfect Competition for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and UAE; monopolistic competition for Bahrain
and Qatar and monopoly for Oman.
1 SEE stands for South Eastern Europe.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 4: Mean and Std. Dev. of outputs and input prices employed in the
translog specication
Country/variables Expenses Z-Score* Loans Deposits NII OEA Price of Price of OBS
Funds Capital
Argentina 152749 20.982 672903 878409 82747 748337 0.109 0.082 338
(293837) (51.407) (1348218) (159862) (161821) (1557448) (0.213) (0.059)
Brazil 1383722 27.288 3212067 4230787 252384 5301560 1.074 0.084 535
(3636441) (38.477) (9950336) (13000000) (781117) (15400000) (6.507) (0.075)
Chile 411081 55.459 3727192 3619562 82683 1092382 0.059 0.037 154
(592297) (61.251) (5240769) (5082460) (110201) (1633905) (0.032) (0.026)
Colombia 262049 35.100 1404781 1714300 121790 644983 0.169 0.064 210
(401354) (77.035) (2391686) (2582393) (180123) (762196) (0.816) (0.042)
Costa Rica 66279 72.772 320153 425616 12088 173177 0.110 0.055 202
(114858) (121.064) (497015) (765862) (23698) (379610) (0.103) (0.021)
Dominican 75124 29.342 279828 373063 19125 151416 0.680 0.085 159
(115846) (31.670) (507883) (714574) (40109) (287855) (5.342) (0.063)
Mexico 1104384 31.868 4967057 6242088 207100 2798891 0.182 0.058 218
(1668294) (37.403) (7441757) (9761256) (428361) (5637125) (0.452) (0.050)
Panama 94447 56.002 853835 999884 27397 339442 0.045 0.028 230
(160108) (39.730) (1405369) (1527944) (54732) (431514) (0.019) (0.022)
Peru 206494 35.885 1459859 2067655 68783 776308 0.042 0.053 84
(232745) (31.361) (1864046) (2533111) (101109) (975164) (0.032) (0.027)
Venezuela 191186 23.928 788014 1440600 51848 506641 0.073 0.071 220
(290065) (31.375) (1435133) (2171726) (82265) (686350) (0.066) (0.033)
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
*The Z-score ranges from 2003 to 2008, since we use two-lagged variables in its calculation.
Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. p0 p25 p50 p75 p100
Liquidity 0.250 0.171 0.001 0.131 0.212 0.338 0.970
Capital Ratio 0.140 0.112 -0.683 0.084 0.110 0.153 0.947
SIZE 13.840 1.827 8.941 12.610 13.740 15.040 19.360
LLR (in %) 4.771 5.226 0 1.965 3.310 5.850 76.920
ROA 0.023 0.036 -0.656 0.011 0.020 0.032 0.313
ROE 0.153 1.378 -52.440 0.101 0.179 0.276 3.735






























































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 7: Country-environmental variables









Argentina 8.487 5.383 0.715 13.952 15.600 0.113
(0.885) (1.777) (0.137) (0.253) (2.182) (0.005)
Brazil 4.123 5.466 0.935 21.679 43.870 0.093
(1.768) (2.013) (0.034) (0.458) (19.423) (0.005)
Chile 4.668 7.818 1.027 21.524 110.483 0.084
(1.043) (2.200) (0.050) (0.494) (35.126) (0.007)
Colombia 5.337 3.425 0.826 40.656 46.440 0.121
(1.813) (1.108) (0.077) (1.206) (19.215) (0.007)
Costa Rica 5.956 5.174 0.756 84.357 248.524 0.133
(2.265) (0.892) (0.101) (3.243) (59.150) (0.006)
Dominican 5.787 3.757 0.702 176.315 180.328 0.116
(4.471) (1.043) (0.080) (4.722) (48.467) (0.010)
Mexico 3.116 8.540 0.779 53.308 103.746 0.113
(1.418) (1.347) (0.044) (0.696) (9.959) (0.016)
Panama 8.029 5.207 0.846 43.136 501.525 0.111
(2.429) (0.970) (0.071) (1.419) (122.404) (0.003)
Perub 7.648 3.422 0.708 21.559 20.805 0.105
(1.875) (0.730) (0.044) (0.580) (7.386) (0.012)
Venezuela 7.403 6.599 0.516 29.284 54.820 0.160
(8.638) (2.938) (0.103) (1.087) (30.614) (0.047)
aIn thousands of Dollars (USD) per individual.
b The time period for period ranges only from 2004 to 2008 due to the lack
of data.
Source: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Latin American
central banks.
33Table 8: Boone indicator of the loans market by banking sector
B t Method Endogeneity test
(p-value)
Argentina -0.436*** -2.96 OLS 0.31
Brazil -0.480*** -5.04 OLS 0.50
Chile -0.233 -1.34 OLS 0.61
Colombia -1.200** -6.20 OLS 0.32
Costa Rica -0.218** -2.60 OLS 0.86
Dominican Rep. -0.349* -1.94 OLS 0.96
Mexico -0.493** -2.79 OLS 0.16
Panama -0.622** -2.88 OLS 0.64
Peru -1.207*** -5.77 GMM 0.04
Venezuela -0.416*** -2.92 OLS 0.20
Note: this table presents the estimation of the Boone indicator () as in
equation (4). The more negative it is, the more competitive is the banking
market considered. Before deciding which estimator to employ, we conduct
a endogeneity test for the marginal cost variable. If we reject the null hy-
pothesis of exogeneity, we use the GMM estimator. On the other hand, if
we cannot reject this null hypothesis, we employ the OLS xed eects esti-
mator. In both cases, we consider heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust
standard errors (HAC).










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 10: The eect of competition on Stability Ineciency
[1] [2] [3] [4]
VARIABLES Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine.
Intercept -3.4760** -2.6470* -1.9455 0.8755
(1.5475) (1.5528) (1.7249) (1.2637)
LLR 0.1374*** 0.1219*** 0.1018*** 0.0931***
(0.0234) (0.0227) (0.0162) (0.0132)
Capital Ratio -5.6428*** -2.4240** -2.3524*** -2.155***











SIZE -0.0802 0.0658 -0.1227 -0.1879**
(0.0721) (0.0806) (0.0763) (0.0883)
Liquidity 2.0273*** 1.5065** 1.6201*** 1.8411***
(0.6816) (0.6388) (0.5991) (0.6106)
Private 0.9061*** 0.8666*** 0.7415*** 0.8034***
(0.3179) (0.3213) (0.2714) (0.2998)
Foreign 1.7874*** 1.5274*** 1.6524*** 1.8161***
(0.4791) (0.4505) (0.4137) (0.4336)
2 1.9299*** 1.7881*** 1.7101*** 1.6776***
(0.3288) (0.3479) (0.2735) (0.2657)

 0.6353*** 0.5936*** 0.5787*** 0.5343***
(0.0695) (0.0907) (0.0786) (0.0892)
Max. Likel. -2117.846 -2141.079 -2108.971 -2126.329
Note: this table presents the estimation results of our main model, where we test whether competition in
uences stability
ineciency controlling by other variables. We estimate the Z-score translog function, as in equation (6), which Fang
et al. (2011) propose. Unlikely the common eciency frontiers of costs and prots, this approach takes into account the
bank's risk-taking behavior. The measure of competition is the time-varying Boone Indicator that we have estimated
previously and reported the results in table 9. In fact, in order to facilitate the results' interpretation, we have employed
the absolute value of this indicator. Again, to make the results more presentable, we have also added (in columns [2] to
[4]) specications were we use dummies of high, average and low competition, respectively, whose construction we explain
in section 2.2. Finally, 2 is the sum of the variance of the error terms in equation (2), i.e. 2 = 2
 + 2
. The ratio
between the variance of the ineciency variance and total variance is equal to 
. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
36Table 11: The eect of competition on Stability Ineciency and how it
changes with bank's size
[2] [2] [2] [2]
VARIABLES Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine.
Intercept 11.7495** -1.4727 -0.6018 0.5837
(5.9157) (1.3087) (4.0078) (1.3112)
LLR 0.1148*** 0.1010*** 0.1008*** 0.0923***
(0.0191) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0138)
Capital Ratio -2.5280** -1.3793* -2.2419** -2.1551***















High Comp. * SIZE -0.6546*
(0.3359)
Avg Comp. * SIZE 0.0992
(0.2809)
Low Comp. * SIZE 0.4970*
(0.2936)
SIZE -1.6533*** 0.0179 -0.2296 -0.1529*
(0.5660) (0.0724) (0.3151) (0.0815)
Liquidity 2.2415*** 1.3576** 1.6619*** 1.6595***
(0.6198) (0.5349) (0.6349) (0.6267)
Private 0.7039*** 0.7226** 0.7403** 0.7665**
(0.2647) (0.2827) (0.2980) (0.3336)
Foreign 1.5409*** 1.2734*** 1.6484*** 1.7511***
(0.3829) (0.3563) (0.4407) (0.4710)
2 1.7257*** 1.6424*** 1.7107*** 1.6659***
(0.2686) (0.2651) (0.2811) (0.2631)

 0.5755*** 0.5783*** 0.5772*** 0.5447***
(0.0720) (0.0791) (0.0766) (0.0900)
Max. Likel. -2093.823 -2138.599 -2108.904 -2124.979
Note: this table presents the estimation results of our main model, where we test whether competition in
uences stability
ineciency controlling by other variables. We estimate the Z-score translog function, as in equation (6), which Fang
et al. (2011) propose. Unlikely the common eciency frontiers of costs and prots, this approach takes into account the
bank's risk-taking behavior. The measure of competition is the time-varying Boone Indicator that we have estimated
previously and reported the results in table 9. In fact, in order to facilitate the results' interpretation, we have employed
the absolute value of this indicator. Again, to make the results more presentable, we have also added (in columns [2] to
[4]) specications were we use dummies of high, average and low competition, respectively, whose construction we explain
in section 2.2. Specically in this table, we interact the competition variable and dummies with the variable SIZE to
determine whether the eect of competition on risk-taking varies as function of bank's size. Finally, 2 is the sum of the
variance of the error terms in equation (2), i.e. 2 = 2
 + 2
. The ratio between the variance of the ineciency variance
and total variance is equal to 
. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
37Table 12: The eect of competition on Stability Ineciency and how it
changes with the capital ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4]
VARIABLES Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine.
Intercept -14.6270*** -3.0464 -0.7742 0.7067
(3.9837) (2.1282) (1.6239) (1.2264)
LLR 0.1153*** 0.1352*** 0.0848*** 0.0921***
(0.0195) (0.0399) (0.0164) (0.0128)
Capital Ratio -10.1520 -3.2417* -3.7974*** -1.9417***















High Comp.*Capital Ratio 1.5945
(2.5987)
Avg Comp.*Capital Ratio 2.5072
(1.736)
Low Comp.*Capital Ratio -29.214**
(14.893)
SIZE -0.0670 0.0623 -0.0943 -0.1540**
(0.0741) (0.0862) (0.0790) (0.0727)
Liquidity 1.8218*** 1.7446* 1.2260** 1.5313**
(0.5407) (0.9361) (0.5357) (0.5654)
Private 0.6354** 0.9799** 0.5780** 0.7519**
(0.2732) (0.4246) (0.2744) (0.2948)
Foreign 1.4945*** 1.7388** 1.3014*** 1.6820***
(0.3860) (0.6964) (0.4011) (0.4154)
2 1.5805*** 1.9437*** 1.5224*** 1.6893***
(0.2384) (0.5355) (0.2414) (0.2429)

 0.50684*** 0.6223*** 0.5469*** 0.5699***
(0.0800) (0.1024) (0.0775) (0.0744)
Max. Likel. -2087.235 -2140.934 -2108.136 -2120.743
Note: this table presents the estimation results of our main model, where we test whether competition in
uences stability
ineciency controlling by other variables. We estimate the Z-score translog function, as in equation (6), which Fang
et al. (2011) propose. Unlikely the common eciency frontiers of costs and prots, this approach takes into account the
bank's risk-taking behavior. The measure of competition is the time-varying Boone Indicator that we have estimated
previously and reported the results in table 9. In fact, in order to facilitate the results' interpretation, we have employed
the absolute value of this indicator. Again, to make the results more presentable, we have also added (in columns [2] to
[4]) specications were we use dummies of high, average and low competition, respectively, whose construction we explain
in section 2.2. Specically in this table, we interact the competition variable and dummies with the variable Capital Ratio
to determine whether the eect of competition on risk-taking varies as function of bank's capital ratio. Finally, 2 is
the sum of the variance of the error terms in equation (2), i.e. 2 = 2
 + 2
. The ratio between the variance of the
ineciency variance and total variance is equal to 
. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
38Table 13: The eect of competition on Stability Ineciency and how it
changes with bank's size and the capital ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4]
VARIABLES Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine. Z-Score Ine.
Intercept -47.081*** -4.1779* -2.8354 -3.7956
(10.730) (2.3203) (2.7891) (2.5094)
LLR 0.1083*** 0.1283*** 0.0935*** 0.1264***
(0.015) (0.0289) (0.0155) (0.0271)
Capital Ratio 278.65*** 14.9243*** 36.475** 23.511**

























High Comp.*Capital Ratio 63.4260*
(33.6931)
Avg Comp.*Capital Ratio -25.827
(16.047)
Low Comp.*Capital Ratio -673.1600
(565.38)
SIZE*Capital Ratio -27.576*** -1.3843* -3.7646** -2.2225**





High Comp.*SIZE*Capital Ratio -5.9849*
(3.1577)
Avg Comp.*SIZE*Capital Ratio 2.7894*
(1.5299)
Low Comp.*SIZE*Capital Ratio 44.2270
(37.757)
SIZE 3.3335*** 0.1799 0.1229 0.1099
(0.7818) (0.1188) (0.1890) (0.1218)
Liquidity 1.4607*** 1.8270** 1.3554*** 2.2636**
(0.4234) (0.7633) (0.5050) (0.9030)
Private 0.5565*** 0.7799** 0.5836** 0.9185**
(0.1968) (0.3550) (0.2475) (0.4134)
Foreign 1.2232*** 1.5362*** 1.338*** 2.2683***
(0.2625) (0.5583) (0.3688) (0.6700)
2 1.3835*** 1.8112*** 1.5655*** 2.0358***
(0.1628) (0.3989) (0.2362) (0.4642)

 0.4544*** 0.6153*** 0.5679*** 0.6296***
(0.0796) (0.0821) (0.0751) (0.0854)
Max. Likel. -2072.239 -2129.644 -2101.416 -2113.723
Note: this table presents the estimation results of our main model, where we test whether competition in
uences stability
ineciency controlling by other variables. We estimate the Z-score translog function, as in equation (6), which Fang
et al. (2011) propose. Unlikely the common eciency frontiers of costs and prots, this approach takes into account the
bank's risk-taking behavior. The measure of competition is the time-varying Boone Indicator that we have estimated
previously and reported the results in table 9. In fact, in order to facilitate the results' interpretation, we have employed
the absolute value of this indicator. Again, to make the results more presentable, we have also added (in columns [2] to
[4]) specications were we use dummies of high, average and low competition, respectively, whose construction we explain
in section 2.2. Specically in this table, we interact the competition variable and dummies with the variables SIZE and
Capital Ratio to determine whether the eect of competition on risk-taking varies as function of bank's size and capital
ratio. Finally, 2 is the sum of the variance of the error terms in equation (2), i.e. 2 = 2
 + 2
. The ratio between the
variance of the ineciency variance and total variance is equal to 
. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
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